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1 Introduction
The turnover view of unemployment has a firm grip on modern think-
ing about joblessness in the United States. Unemployment occurs
when a worker departs from a job and spends time finding a new job.
In addition, unemployment arises when a person looks for a new job
after a period out of the labor force. Job-seekers find new jobs at
monthly rates ranging from 10 to 40 percent. Unemployment varies
positively with the separation rate and negatively with the job-finding
rate.
For many years, students of the labor market believed that reces-
sions—periods of sharply rising unemployment—were the result of
higher separation rates from jobs as well as lower job-finding rates.
In this view, a recession begins with a wave of layoffs, mainly
in cyclical durable-goods industries. As the labor market becomes
clogged with job-seekers, job-finding rates go down and the duration
of unemployment rises. The second part of this account is not in dis-
pute. Much of this paper will focus on the large movements at cyclical
and subcyclical frequencies in the job-finding rate. But new research
and new data have challenged the first part. The new view is that sep-
arations are not an important part of the story of rising unemployment
in recessions. Unemployment is high in a recession because jobs are
hard to find, not because more job-seekers have been dumped into the
labor market by elevated separation rates.
The new view puts the focus on the hiring decision as the central
topic for understanding cyclical variation in unemployment. The labor
market goes through extended periods when the number of new hires
remains constant despite the availability of large numbers of job-
seekers. The surplus created by a new hire appears to be greater in102 Hall
those periods than when unemployment is lower. Productivity is
hardly cyclical, so the marginal product of a new hire is as high as
ever. The opportunity cost of a job-seeker is lower in a soft labor mar-
ket. The surplus arises from the gap between the marginal product
and the opportunity cost. In spite of the substantial joint gain from a
hire, employers do not raise hiring rates during periods of high unem-
ployment. Slack labor markets persist for several years following a
recession. The challenge to unemployment theory is to explain why
hiring remains stable. Arbitrage does not close the gap in the labor
market as fast as it seems to in other markets. In addition to experienc-
ing periods of high unemployment following every recession, the
economy suffers from chronically high unemployment for extended
periods, such as the 1970s and 1980s. These periods are equally
puzzling.
I begin by documenting the surprising proposition that layoffs and
other separations do not rise during the time when output and em-
ployment are falling at the beginning of a recession. The evidence
is strongest for the most recent recession, thanks to a survey that
measures separations directly, across the entire economy. For earlier
periods, the evidence is less direct but reasonably compelling. I stress
that the proposition does not mean that employers make all employ-
ment adjustments through variations in hires and keep separations at
a constant level independent of the need to adjust their employment
levels. The point is that the changes in separation rates that accompany
employment changes at the industry or aggregate level are tiny com-
pared to the regular flow of workers out of jobs.
Job-seekers are unemployed, out of the labor force, or employed in
jobs they would like to leave. I show that only a minority of new hires
come from the unemployed. Hence, the measurement of a job-finding
rate would ideally incorporate job-seekers in all three statuses—
unemployed, out of the labor force, or employed. Despite the impor-
tance of the employed among job-seekers, I am unable to include them
for lack of data. I am able to include a group of those out of the labor
force whose behavior is known to be similar to those counted as unem-
ployed. I then calculate a job-finding rate as the ratio of new hires to
my measure of job-seekers. The job-finding rate is highly cyclical—it
plunges in every recession. It also has important movements at lower
frequencies—it was high in the 1960s and 1990s and low in the 1970s
and 1980s. One of my themes is that the subcyclical movements of the
job-finding rates are just as informative and puzzling as the cyclicalJob Loss, Job Finding, and Unemployment 103
movements. A full understanding of the labor market requires a uni-
fied explanation of the cyclical and subcyclical movements.
The past few years have seen an explosion of new models of the job-
finding process. The models share some common features. In partic-
ular, information limitations constrain the labor market. Job-seekers
and employers are imperfectly informed about each others' identities.
A matching technology describes the random meetings of job-seekers
and employers. In most of the models, the job-seeker and the employer
make a bilateral wage bargain after they meet each other. In the stan-
dard model, the wage turns out to be highly responsive to conditions
in the labor market. The wage adjusts immediately to exogenous forces
thought to be candidates for causes of recessions. The standard model
has the classical property that these forces mainly alter the wage and
have little effect on employment and unemployment.
The recent discovery of the limited success of the standard model set
off the explosion of research that introduces mechanisms to amplify the
response of unemployment to driving forces. These models overturn
the classical property of the standard model. Some of them make the
wage less responsive, while others keep the flexible-wage property of
the standard model and achieve amplification through other channels.
The models I discuss here are entirely in the equilibrium tradition of
the standard model. The equilibrium property admits of a fairly pre-
cise definition—periods of high unemployment are not times when
workers and employers could make simple bilateral deals that would
make both better off. In this respect, the models considered here differ
from another interesting branch of business-cycle theory that invokes
sticky wages and prices that do result in bilateral inefficiencies. Dis-
cussion of the relative roles of the equilibrium models against dis-
equilibrium models in the ultimate understanding of unemployment
movements is beyond the scope of this paper, though it is not a secret
that I lean toward the equilibrium models.
My review of new models of the job-finding process identifies a long
list of driving forces and amplification mechanisms that may play a
role in the ultimate theory of the dynamics of the aggregate labor mar-
ket. The driving force that receives the most attention is productivity.
Other forces that figure in most models include hiring costs, unem-
ployment compensation, the separation rate, and the real interest rate.
Recent thinking has added the shapes of distributions of match infor-
mation private to employers or to workers, a wage norm, and costs of
delay during bargaining. I do not reach a strong conclusion about the104 Hall
roles of the driving forces. Indeed, I rather suspect that the ultimate ac-
count of recessions and other movements of unemployment will give
weight to quite a few of them—recessions are not the uniform result of
a single cause.
2 The Separation Rate
The separation rate is the monthly rate of departure from jobs for all
reasons: layoffs, quits, firings, and the termination of time-limited em-
ployment. Although the distinctions among the various types of sepa-
ration are important for a full account of flows in the labor market, I
will concentrate on the overall separation rate. I think it is a mistake to
treat layoffs and quits as if they were sharply distinguished. In the
theory of turnover, a separation occurs when it is no longer in the mu-
tual interest of worker and employer to continue the match. The layoff-
quit distinction turns on institutional arrangements about who takes
the initiative in breaking the match. Models have not yet tackled sys-
tematically the question of the design of these arrangements.
2.1 New Survey Data on Separations
Knowledge of the behavior of separations advanced materially with
the introduction of an economy-wide survey of gross flows in the
labor market: the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS).
Each month a large stratified sample of employers report on separa-
tions and hires. The survey began in December 2000, so it tracked the
recession that began in early 2001. Figure 2.1 shows the JOLTS separa-
tion rate and the standard unemployment rate from the Current Popu-
lation Survey (CPS). The rise in unemployment through 2001 has no
counterpart in higher separation rates. Rather, the separation rate fell a
bit.
The JOLTS data show definitively that separations did not rise in the
recession of 2001. It would be a leap to conclude that separations were
equally constant in earlier recessions or even that they will remain con-
stant in future recessions. The data in figure 2.1 may reveal only that
the recession of 2001 was unique.
The breakdown of quits and involuntary separations (all categories
of separations apart from quits—mostly layoffs) at the bottom of figure
2.1 shows, not surprisingly, that quits fell during the contraction and
























Separation and Unemployment Rates, December 2000 to October 2004
these changes is small. The overwhelming message from figure 2.1 is
that the recession involved no significant increase in departures from
jobs.
2.2 The Roles of Hiring and Separations in Adjusting the
Employment Level
The finding that the separation rate hardly declined during the reces-
sion of 2001 says almost nothing about how employment adjustments
divide between hires and separations. The finding says that the part of
separations that reflects employment adjustment is small in compari-
son to the general level of separations. Table 2.1 shows why this prop-
osition has to be true. It compares the average monthly separation rate
from JOLTS to the standard deviation of monthly employment changes
as reported in the BLS payroll employment data.
In the typical industry—as reflected in the weighted average
reported in the last line of table 2.1—more than 3 percent of workers
depart employment each month. The standard deviation of employ-
ment change, on the other hand, is only about 0.7 percent. Further-
more, many of the larger monthly deviations are transitory, unlike
the long sequence of declines that occur in a recession. The standard106 Hall
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deviation of employment changes over twelve-month spans, stated at
monthly rates, is less than 0.3 percent. Even if all employment changes
occurred through changes in the separation rate and none through
changes in hiring, the changes in the separation rate would be close to
invisible because of the high normal level of separations.
Next I will present some results based on the hypothesis that JOLTS
reveals behavior that was stable over the period considered in this
paper, 1948 to 2004. To generate a rough approximation of separations
for years before JOLTS, I regress the JOLTS separation rate on industry
employment-growth variables. Because an industry can expand rap-
idly only by hiring and can contract rapidly only through separations,
I include the positive part of growth separately from the negative part.
I pooled the JOLTS data for the eighteen industries listed in table 2.1,
jointly accounting for all civilian employment, over the forty-six avail-
able monthly observations. I used seasonally unadjusted data for all
variables (the BLS has not released seasonally adjusted data for JOLTS
at the industry level). The resulting estimate of the effect of negative
industry employment growth on separations is 0.29 with a standard
error of 0.04, and the estimate of the effect of positive industry growth
is —0.05 with a standard error of 0.02. These results confirm asym-
metry in a reduced form sense, but they do not deserve structural
interpretations because there is no reason to expect that the distur-
bance in the equation is uncorrelated with employment growth. The
equation serves only its intended purpose of measuring the expecta-
tion of separations conditional on employment growth.
Figure 2.2 displays the fitted separations in terms of economy-wide
aggregates, formed by applying employment weights to the results
by industry. I consolidate to the level of the fifteen JOLTS industries
that can be matched to payroll employment data back to 1948. The
figure shows twelve-month centered moving averages. The smooth
line labeled "Component from Weighted Industry Constants" shows
that the overall predicted separation rate rose gradually over the pe-
riod because of a change in the industry mix toward those with higher
constants in the regression. The line at the bottom shows the separa-
tions predicted from employment change. It demonstrates the declin-
ing volatility that has attracted much recent comment. Although the
employment-change component had little role in the recessions of
1990-1991 and 2001, it did make a noticeable contribution in earlier
recessions. Notice that the fitted separation rate shows a small increase
in 2000-2001, beginning just before JOLTS became available.108 Hall
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Calculated Separation Rate and Components
2.3 Estimates of the Entry Rate to Unemployment
About one-fifth of separated workers enter unemployment (see table
2.2, below), so the entry rate to unemployment sheds some light on
the separation rate. Robert Shimer has made estimates of the entry
rate from data from the Current Population Survey (Shimer 2005b).
He concludes that there is little tendency for the rate to rise in
recessions. He starts with published data on total unemployment and
on short-duration unemployment. The latter serves as a measure of
the flow into unemployment. His procedure pays close attention to
issues of time aggregation. The relation between the inflow to unem-
ployment and the stock of unemployed reveals the exit rate from
unemployment—the flow probability of leaving unemployment by
finding work or leaving the labor force. From the stock of unemploy-
ment and his calculated exit rate, he infers the entry rate.
The entry rate to unemployment measures the separation rate from
employment if every worker leaving a job becomes unemployed and if
everybody becoming unemployed was previously employed. Neither
of these holds even as a first approximation. Transitions from jobs toJob Loss, Job Finding, and Unemployment 109
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Figure 2.3
Shimer's Unemployment Entry Rate Calculated from the CPS
new jobs without intervening unemployment are common and so are
transitions from employment to out of the labor force and from out of
the labor force to unemployment. Shinier (2005c) shows that the flow
from employment to out of the labor force is not cyclical, though it has
subcyclical trends. He also shows that the flow from out of the labor
force to unemployment rises slightly in recessions, so removing it from
his measure of separations would strengthen his finding that the sepa-
ration rate does not rise in recessions. Finally, he shows that, during
the time since the CPS was revised to include the relevant question,
job-to-job transitions fell during the one observed recession, in 2001.
Figure 2.3 shows Shimer's calculated entry rate to unemployment.
The rate jumped a bit in some recessions, such as 1973-1975 and
1981-1982, but hardly increased at all in the recessions of 1990-1991
and 2001.
2.4 Separations Measured Directly from Flows in the CPS
Closely related to Shimer's approach is direct measurement of separa-
tions from the raw data from the CPS (I am grateful to Shimer for pro-
viding his compilations of the data). The CPS was not designed to110 Hall
measure flows; measurement is only possible because, in most months,
one can match data for people reported in that month to data reported
in the previous month. Flows are inferred from differences in status
reported in consecutive months. As a result, random errors in measur-
ing status raise the levels of the flows. This problem has impeded re-
search on labor-market dynamics based on the CPS. Longitudinal data
overcome the problem—I discuss one important longitudinal survey
below.
Starting in 1994, the CPS has provided a direct measure of separa-
tions—it added a question for a person who has been at work in suc-
cessive months whether it is for the same or a different employer.
Separations are the number of people who were at work in one month
and unemployed the next month plus the number at work in one
month and not in the labor force the next month plus those at work in
both months but with different employers. Figure 2.4 shows the flows
as twelve-month centered moving averages of seasonally unadjusted
data.
The first feature to note about the CPS measure of separations is that
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Figure 2.4
Separation Rate Measured in the CPS, 1994-2004Job Loss, Job Finding, and Unemployment 111
rate shown in figures 2.1 and 2.2 of a bit over 3 percent. Separation
rates are sensitive to the accounting period because a small fraction of
jobs but a large fraction of separations come from jobs lasting as little
as a day—see Hall (1995). Both surveys use the same accounting
period—a month—so the length of the accounting period cannot
be a factor explaining the large discrepancy in average separations.
Rather, random errors in measuring status are the likely cause of the
discrepancy.
The CPS separation rate in figure 2.4 shows no spike during the 2001
recession, confirming the finding of the JOLTS survey in figure 2.1. The
flow from employment to unemployment rose a bit during the reces-
sion, while the flow from employment to a new job without interven-
ing unemployment fell. This shift occurred because jobs became harder
to find. The flow from employment to out of the labor force—always
surprisingly high—also fell slightly after 2001.
Figure 2.4 shows the difficulty in measuring separations from the
flow into unemployment. Only about 20 percent of workers leaving
employment become unemployed. The remaining 80 percent are usu-
ally split about evenly between moving directly to new jobs and leav-
ing the labor force.
Nagypal (2004a) has studied the CPS data on total separations in an
econometric framework that takes account of changes in demographic
and industry mix. Her results confirm that there was no rise in separa-
tions in the recession in 2001.
The CPS did not report job-to-job transitions before 1994 but did re-
port the other two flows out of employment, as shown in figure 2.5.
Notice that the sum does rise distinctly in recessions. This appears to
be the result of the omission of job-job transitions, which fall in reces-
sions. There is nothing in the CPS flows data to suggest that total sepa-
rations, including the unmeasured job-job flow, rise in recessions. The
cyclical stability of separations remains unchallenged by the CPS data
prior to 1994.
The flow of workers out of the labor force shown in the middle line
of figure 2.5 has a pronounced downward trend through 1990. The
employment to unemployment flow trends upward through the early
1980s. As a result, the sum is at a high level through the early 1980s
and then declines. Part of this high level may be offset by lower job-job
separations. But there is some indication of a disagreement between
the constancy of the separation rate shown in figure 2.2 (and the other
data to be discussed shortly) and the CPS flows.112 Hall
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Figure 2.5
Flows out of Employment in the CPS, 1967-2004
2.5 Separation Rates from the Survey of Income and Program
Participation
Gottschalk and Moffitt (2000) compiled data from the Survey of In-
come and Program Participation (SIPP) for the period 1983 to 1995 on
monthly separation rates. Although the SIPP contains data for only
about 30,000 workers, its design is far better suited to the measurement
of labor-market transitions than is the CPS. Figure 2.6 shows the sepa-
ration rate for the single largest demographic group in the study, white
males. Results for other groups are quite similar.
The separation rate from the SIPP shows almost none of the discrep-
ancy in overall level relative to JOLTS found in the CPS. It also con-
tradicts the downward trend in CPS separations in figure 2.4. Except
for bulges in 1985 and 1994, the SIPP separation rate supports the hy-
pothesis of constant separations. These bulges—both in years of high
employment growth when separations should be slightly lower, ac-
cording to the earlier results—have no obvious explanation.
2.6 Separation Rates Inferred from Data on Job Tenure
Another useful source of information is a question about tenure that
has appeared every few years in the March CPS. The fraction ofJob Loss, Job Finding, and Unemployment 113
0.06
0.02
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Year
Figure 2.6
Gottschalk and Moffitt's Separation Rate for White Males from SIPP
Reprinted with permission of Robert Moffitt.
workers who started work recently is a measure of the hiring rate. As
noted earlier, differences between the hiring rate and the separation
are tiny, so the tenure data come close to revealing the separation rate.
Although the CPS records tenure in months if it is one year or less, I
have not found a tabulation of the data that reports the one-month fig-
ure separately, which is the measure most comparable to the others I
consider in this paper. Jaeger and Stevens (2000) tabulate the fraction
of workers with tenure of one year or less, as shown in figure 2.7.
Higher monthly separation rates would result in higher fractions of
workers with short tenure. Except the one high figure in 1979, the low-
tenure fraction is close to constant. Again, I find support for the view
that the separation rate has been constant over past decades, despite
the higher apparent rate in the CPS data.
Much additional research could be done on this point with existing
sources. My tentative conclusion is that a constant separation rate is
the best approximation over past decades. But this conclusion comes
from examining a number of sources, each of which shows movement
over the period, and finding that the movements are not correlated.
The evidence is not strong. And, of course, the constancy of the separa-
tion rate in figure 2.2 is virtually an assumption and should not be
taken as confirmation of constancy.
2.7 Relation between Separations and Job Destruction
Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) introduced the concept of job destruction
to labor turnover analysis. It is important to distinguish job destruction114 Hall
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Figure 2.7
Jaeger and Stevens's Data on Tenure of One Year or Less from the March CPS
from separations. At the plant level, job destruction occurs when em-
ployment shrinks—it is the separation rate less the hiring rate, or zero,
whichever is greater. At the aggregate level, the job-destruction rate is
job destruction divided by employment, averaged across all firms,
including those creating rather than destroying jobs.
The job-destruction rate is a close cousin of employment growth. To
see this, consider the following simple model at the plant level:
Xi,t = zt + ti,t (2.1)
Here zt is the aggregate component and ezf is the plant-specific compo-
nent of employment growth x^t. Suppose that e!f is identically distrib-
uted across plants and time with cdf F(e). The implied job-destruction
rate is
dt = E(max(-x, 0)) = - f * (zt + e) dF(e) = -ztF(-zt) - fi{-zt) (2.2) J—00
Here //(•) is the mean of e truncated at the designated point. Thus the
job-destruction rate is a function of the aggregate component of em-
ployment growth alone.
Davis's discussion following this paper calculates dt and compares it
to job destruction measured directly from plant-level data for manu-Job Loss, Job Finding, and Unemployment 115
facturing only. The version calculated from employment growth, dt,
tracks job destruction quite well in most years, especially recently. It
falls somewhat short for the biggest spikes, in the severe contractions
of 1973-1975 and 1981-1982. As Davis explains, shifts of the distribu-
tion, notably increasing frequencies of major employment reductions,
occurred in these contractions.
The spike of job destruction that Davis and Haltiwanger find in
recessions does not contradict the point I made at the beginning of this
section that the shrinkage of employment during a recession is at such
a low monthly rate in comparison to the usual level of separations as to
be essentially invisible. I note also that job destruction would occur in a
situation where all employment reductions took the form of reductions
in the hiring rate rather than increases in separations.
3 Unemployment and the Job-Finding Rate
Because the separation rate is close to constant—or at least does not
rise in recessions—all of the burden of explaining fluctuations in the
unemployment rate falls on variations in the rate that job-seekers find
jobs. But there are many ways to measure the job-finding rate. As the
CPS flows data demonstrate, workers often change jobs without visible
intervening unemployment. Thus, there is a job-finding rate for job-
holders. People often take jobs after having been out of the labor force,
so there is a job-finding rate for that group. And the job-finding rate for
the unemployed is a third important concept.
A job-finding rate is the ratio of the flow from another activity into
employment, divided by the number of people seeking to find jobs.
Finding the denominator for any job-finding rate is a challenge. Only a
minority of the employed are looking for work—most have sufficiently
strong comparative advantages in their current jobs so that the likeli-
hood of finding better jobs is small. A job-finding rate for the employed
that took total employment as the denominator would fail to record
any significant changes, given the constancy of the numerator.
Finding a denominator for those out of the labor force encounters
the same obstacles. Most people not working or looking for work have
a strong comparative advantage in some nonwork activity, so they are
not looking for work.
To deal with this issue, I proceed in the following way. First, I do not
attempt to measure a job-finding rate for the employed. I believe that
the rate based on a denominator that omits employed job-seekers is116 Hall
Table 2.2
Transition Matrix for the CPS, 1967-2004, Percent per Month
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Source: Robert Shimer's tabulations of raw data from the CPS.
the best available measure. When it is hard for the unemployed or
those out of the labor force to find jobs, it is surely likely to be just as
hard for those thinking of leaving existing jobs to find new jobs. This
relation is an implication of the various recent models incorporating
on-the-job searches, discussed in a later section.
Second, I consider a measure of unemployment expanded to include
people who are classified as out of the labor force in a given month
but are likely to move into the labor force soon. The improvements
in the CPS introduced in 1994 included questions that identify this
group—see Kodrzycki (2000). The group includes those classified as
discouraged workers, those who want to work but believe no work is
available for a variety of reasons. It also includes marginally attached
workers, who give reasons such as transportation problems or child-
care responsibilities that would indicate a likelihood of return to the
labor force in the near future.
Table 2.2 shows the reason for including people in the denominator
who are classified as out of the labor force but with high likelihoods of
job-seeking. The table gives the transition matrix in the CPS among the
three states of not being in the labor force, being unemployed, and
working. Each month, 7.2 percent of those classified as out of the labor
force in the previous month are in the labor force this month. About
one-third become unemployed and two-thirds become employed. The
high transition rate from out of the labor force directly to employment
suggests that some fraction of those classified as out of the labor force
are nonetheless effectively job-seekers. They find jobs without passing
through unemployment, even though they did not previously report
any of the job-seeking activities that would have placed them in the
unemployment category in the CPS.
It would be desirable to validate the inclusion of the extra unem-
ployed in my measure of expanded unemployment by tabulating theJob Loss, Job Finding, and Unemployment 117




transition matrix for this concept, along with the remaining group that
is thought to be more firmly out of the labor force and the employed.
The expanded unemployment rate is available from the Bureau of La-
bor Statistics starting in 1994. I have approximated it for earlier years
by regressing it by the standard unemployment rate for 1994 through
2004 and using the fitted values for the years before 1994. The fit over
the eleven observed years is outstanding (R
2 — 0.96). Although there
is surely some drift in the relation from 1948 through 1993, I doubt
that this is nearly as large as the uncertainty about the separation rate.
Figure 2.8 shows the actual and imputed expanded unemployment
rate.
Figure 2.9 shows the job-finding rate calculated as the ratio of the
new hires implicit in figure 2.2 to the number of job-seekers implicit in
figure 2.8. To calculate the numerator, I add the separation rate and the
rate of employment growth to get the new hire rate. Then I multiply by
the level of employment to get the number of new hires. To calculate
the denominator, I multiply the expanded unemployment rate by the
expanded labor force. The job-finding rate has quite remarkable vola-
tility. It reached high levels in the tight labor markets of the early118 Hall




1950s, the late 1960s, and the late 1990s of over 40 percent per month. It
plunged below 20 percent in the more severe recessions. The volatil-
ity of the job-finding rate is a central fact for macroeconomics to ex-
plain.
3.1 Recruiting Effort
A common feature of modern theories of the job-finding rate is that the
market tightens when the incentives for job creation improve. Thus,
measures of recruiting effort and the job-finding rate should move to-
gether. Figure 2.10 shows that this relationship is remarkably strong.
It shows the only measure of recruiting effort available over a long
period, the Conference Board's index of help-wanted advertising in
newspapers, along with the job-finding rate from figure 2.9.
4 Economics of the Job-Finding Rate
Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982), and Pissarides (1985) introduced
the analysis of the job-finding rate that permeates modern thinking. At
its heart, the analysis considers unemployment as the result of rent
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Help-Wanted Advertising and the Job-Finding Rate
view in Harris and Todaro (1970), where a wage premium in cities
attracts workers from rural areas who form queues for urban jobs. In
the modern view, holding a job has a value above the value of the best
alternative activity. Job-seekers are willing to spend time looking for
work because of the premium for employment.
Harris and Todaro proposed the simplest model of unemployment,
the queue. A job-seeker arriving in the city would join the end of a line
and wait for jobs to open up for the people ahead in the line before
finding a job. The modern analysis refines this view a bit by invoking
a matching technology, but the basic role of the technology is the same
as the role of the queue in Harris and Todaro.
The value that attracts job-seekers depends on the wage that
workers receive upon employment. Thus, a critical piece of the theory
of the job-finding rate is the model of wage determination. Until
recently, the standard model was the Nash bargain. The worker's
threat point is to continue searching rather than work for a candidate
employer, and the employer's threat point is to deny the worker em-
ployment. The wage bargain places the parties on a point partway be-





Equilibrium in the Standard Model
joint surplus, equal to the joint value they achieve from a match less
their values at the threat points. The Nash bargain splits the surplus
between the parties in given proportions.
The standard setup includes a theory of separations, implicit in the
wage-bargain model. If the surplus of an existing match becomes nega-
tive, the parties will split up and a separation will occur. Because sepa-
rations are not actually variable and because models with endogenous
separations have other unrealistic implications, many models assume a
fixed exogenous probability of separation, viewed as a probability that
the productivity of a match will plunge to zero and make the separa-
tion inevitable.
The standard theory of the job-finding rate, depicted in figure 2.11,
runs as follows: employers put resources into recruiting workers. They
expand their efforts until the cost of recruiting a worker exhausts
the employer's share of the surplus from employing the worker. The
job-finding rate depends on the recruiting efforts of employers. The
employer-equilibrium curve in figure 2.11 slopes upward because a
higher surplus draws forth more recruiting effort and creates a tighter
labor market with a higher job-finding rate.
From the job-seeker's perspective, a tighter labor market lowers the
surplus. The surplus is the difference between the value of the outputJob Loss, Job Finding, and Unemployment 121
that a match produces and the opportunity cost of the worker. The op-
portunity cost, in turn, depends on the ease of finding a job—in a tight
market with a high job-finding rate, the opportunity cost is higher and
the surplus from a job is lower. Figure 2.11 shows a downward-sloping
curve depicting job-seeker equilibrium.
The equilibrium of the labor market occurs at the intersection of
the two curves. Notice the key role of the Nash-bargain model of
wage determination. The employer-equilibrium curve deals with the
employer's share of the surplus and the job-seeker-equilibrium with
the job-seeker's share. The Nash assumption locks the two together.
The dashed line in figure 2.11 shows the effect of a 3 percent decline
in productivity. The job-seeker-equilibrium curve shifts downward
slightly, the job-finding rate drops a little, and unemployment rises a
bit. No shift occurs in the employer-equilibrium curve. The shift in
the job-seeker curve is small for the following reason: the surplus is
the difference between the present value of a worker's product and the
worker's opportunity cost. The opportunity cost depends mainly on
the wage that would be paid by alternative jobs. Under the Nash as-
sumption, that wage falls almost as much as does productivity. The
surplus hardly changes. Shimer (2005a) was the first to make this
observation.
The finding of limited response of unemployment to changes in pro-
ductivity suggests that the standard theory is not a satisfactory account
of fluctuations in unemployment. In the typical recession, unemploy-
ment rises by several percentage points and remains high for several
years. No conceivable movement of productivity, when fed into the
standard model, could replicate the observed movements of unem-
ployment in recessions. Shimer's paper set off a quest for alternative
models that could explain the high volatility of unemployment.
Mortensen (2005) and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2005) observe that
Shimer's result is not universal—it rests on an assumption about labor
supply. Shimer and I belong to the school of macroeconomics that
believes that alternative activities for most workers, including unem-
ployment compensation, are worth far less than the workers produce
on the job. The elasticity of labor supply is low. The fundamental driv-
ing force of the standard model is the difference between productivity
and the value of nonwork. A given change in productivity has a larger
proportional effect on that difference if the value of nonwork is close to
the level of productivity. The standard model can generate high levels
of unemployment volatility by setting the value of nonwork only a bit122 Hall
below the level of productivity. The rest of my discussion is for the
benefit of readers who share Shimer's and my belief in a relatively in-
elastic labor supply.
5 Alternative Views of Wage Determination
Much of the effort focusing on creating a modern theory of unemploy-
ment fluctuations replaces the Nash bargain with some other model of
wage determination.
5.1 Fixed Wage
Job-finding and unemployment are highly sensitive to productivity if
the standard model is altered in just one way: by keeping the wage
fixed and unresponsive to changes in productivity—see Shinier (2004).
Figure 2.12 shows why. If the wage is fixed, the surplus received by the
employer is the difference between the present value of the worker's
product and the fixed wage. The employer-equilibrium curve is unaf-
fected, but job-seeker equilibrium no longer plays a role in determining
the job-finding rate. Instead, the diagram has a horizontal line showing
the exogenous value of the surplus. In any reasonable view of the labor
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comparison to the present value of the worker's product. Conse-
quently, a small proportional change in productivity results in a large
proportional change in the surplus. The downward shift of the dashed
line in figure 2.12, corresponding to the same decline in productivity as
in figure 2.11, is substantial. The new equilibrium has a much lower
job-finding rate and correspondingly high unemployment rate.
Hall (2005b) explores some aspects of the fixed wage. Within certain
fairly wide bounds, a fixed wage is an economic equilibrium. Earlier
views of fixed wages invoked disequilibrium—the fixed wage resulted
in an inefficient allocation of labor. Barro (1977) pointed out that pri-
vate inefficiency in bilateral economic relationships was paradoxical
because a simple renegotiation could restore efficiency. The type of
sticky wage I discussed does not result in inefficiency and is free from
Barro's critique, which I have long found utterly persuasive. In a
matching model, the joint surplus measures the width of the bargain-
ing set for the wage. A sticky wage remains efficient as long as it is
within the bargaining set. I derive conditions under which a sticky
wage remains within the bargaining set, even though the boundaries
of the set fluctuate along with productivity. These conditions are not
very restrictive.
Not a single reader of Hall (2005b) has failed to point out that the
demonstration that a sticky wage is an equilibrium is far from an ex-
planation for stickiness. Many other patterns of wage movement are
equilibria, including those that are more volatile than the Nash wage
and result in increases in unemployment when productivity falls. I do
try to connect wage inertia with the idea of a social norm. Still, the pri-
mary reason that the sticky-wage case is interesting is the general im-
pression that wages are, in fact, quite sticky.
The paper also makes the point that wages can be sticky relative to
an index that grows over time. The result is a more sophisticated
model of wage inertia, similar to the model implicit in many discus-
sions of the Phillips curve and monetary nonneutrality.
Gertler and Trigari (2005) develop another version of the equilib-
rium sticky-wage model. Employers and workers make a standard
Nash bargain that last many periods. Workers hired between wage
bargaining episodes receive the previously bargained wage. This setup
delivers the essential feature of the equilibrium sticky-wage model—
the sensitivity of the employer's gain from a new hire to current eco-
nomic conditions. The wage does not respond immediately to those
conditions. Unemployment is sensitive to driving forces until the next124 Hall
wage bargain. The persistence of unemployment fluctuations depends
on the duration of wage bargains.
5.2 Kennan's Model
Kennan (2005) considers the standard model with the following alter-
native model of wage determination: upon forming a candidate match,
the parties toss a coin to decide who will make an offer to the other. If
the employer wins the toss, the employer offers the job-seeker her res-
ervation wage. If the job-seeker wins, he or she has a more complicated
decision because the job-seeker's productivity is known to the em-
ployer but is hidden from the job-seeker. The job-seeker is in the same
position as a bidder in a first-price sealed-bid auction. Kennan makes
assumptions that cause the job-seeker to bid a wage that is insensitive
to current conditions. Thus, he reaches a sticky-wage property as a
derived conclusion rather than as a bald assumption, a step forward.
Kennan's model delivers a high sensitivity of unemployment to
changes in productivity for the reasons shown in figure 2.12.
The sticky-wage conclusion is a special feature of the setup of his
model. The hidden information is binary—match productivity is
either high or low. The job-seeker knows the two values but does not
know which one holds. Kennan assumes an environment where the
job-seeker always picks the lower value, thus guaranteeing employ-
ment but giving the employer a large part of the surplus when the
realization is the higher value of match productivity. Increases in ag-
gregate productivity take the form of a higher probability of the better
level of match productivity, but not enough higher to cause any job-
seeker to bid higher. Thus, a sticky wage is essentially built into the
model.
In a more general version of the model, the job-seeker knows that
match productivity can take on many values or is a continuous ran-
dom variable. In that case, the job-seeker will make a higher bid when
conditions are better, using the general principles of first-price auction
theory. In another variant of this type of model, the wage might be de-
termined by a different procedure, such as a double auction where
both employer and job-seeker make bids. Tawara (2005) generalizes
wage determination in Kennan's model.
Kennan's emphasis on informational rents that vary over time is an
important contribution to the theory of fluctuations in the job-finding
rate. When rents earned by employers are high, firms will invest more
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job-finding rates. Further work in this area may demonstrate that vari-
ation in informational rents might plausibly be large enough to explain
observed fluctuations. Such work needs to elucidate how the exoge-
nous events that trigger recessions cause reductions in rents and thus
bring higher unemployment.
5.3 Reconsideration of the Threat Points in the Wage Bargain
Hall and Milgrom (2005) explain that the threat points considered in
the standard labor-market bargaining model are not credible. Once a
qualified worker and an employer have met and found that they
would enjoy a joint surplus, the threats to disclaim the match are hol-
low. The sequential bargaining framework of Binmore, Rubinstein,
and Wolinsky (1986) considers alternative, credible threats. The parties
alternate in making wage proposals to each other. The threat point of
each is to prolong bargaining by declining an offer and making a
counteroffer. Each understands the implications of the process, so the
unique equilibrium is an immediate Nash-type bargain in which the
threat points are the payoffs to delaying indefinitely.
Changing the standard model in only one respect—changing the
threat points to the payoffs to endless delay—has a profound effect.
The wage becomes fully insulated from conditions in the labor market,
such as unemployment. The wage does respond to productivity, but
only half as much as in the standard model. The result is a strong re-
sponse of unemployment to productivity and other driving forces. The
wage no longer has an equilibrating role. If productivity falls, the part
of the surplus accruing to employers falls sharply, and they cut back
on recruiting effort. The labor market softens dramatically.
We also consider two variants in which the wage is more closely
connected to unemployment, though not as strongly as in the standard
model. First, we alter the matching framework so that, part of the time,
more than one applicant bargains with an employer for a job opening.
If there is a single applicant, the parties engage in the bargaining pro-
cess just described. If there are more applicants, they engage in Ber-
trand competition for the opening, and one of them winds up with the
job but is paid only his or her reservation wage. The employer gains all
of the surplus. Because the likelihood of competition is greater in a soft
labor market, recruiting effort equilibrates the market more aggres-
sively with this modification. Nonetheless, the model delivers a higher
response of unemployment to productivity and other fluctuations than
does the standard model.126 Hall
In the second variant, there is a small probability that a worker will
take another job during the process of bargaining with a prospective
employer. Again, this modification links the wage to conditions in the
labor market but does not completely undo the effect of using credible
threat points in the basic wage-bargaining model.
6 Models That Explain Job-Finding Volatility with Flexible Wages
Research has been active recently in trying to meet the challenge of
Shimer (2005a) without invoking sticky wages directly. In some cases,
low-wage volatility is a conclusion derived from the fundamentals.
6.1 Models with On-the-Job Search
Figure 2.3 shows that the job-to-job flow accounts for almost half of all
separations in normal times. No theory of labor-market dynamics
could possibly be complete without consideration of this key flow.
Many job-seekers are recorded as employed, not unemployed. A num-
ber of authors have created models with on-the-job search—one of the
most prominent is Burdett and Mortensen (1998). Prior to the search
for amplification mechanisms launched by Shimer, these models
tended to deliver even less job-finding volatility than did the basic
Mortensen-Pissarides model—see Nagypal (2004b).
Nagypal combines on-the-job search with a number of other key
ingredients to achieve quite substantial amplification relative to the
Mortensen-Pissarides model, where workers search only after losing
jobs. First, employers need to prefer recruiting people directly out of
other jobs rather than from the unemployed. In the standard model,
employers have the opposite preference because the likelihood of
forming a match with a candidate who is unemployed is higher than
with a candidate who has a job. The latter has a higher reservation
wage. In a recession, when the mix of job-seekers shifts toward the
unemployed, employers intensify recruiting efforts on account of the
more favorable mix. This factor results in the attenuation of the already
low response of the job-finding rate to changes in productivity.
To reverse this effect, Nagypal introduces heterogeneity in job
matches. Workers have different satisfaction levels with their jobs,
which are hidden from employers. Workers hired from unemployment
are less desirable because those who form matches will have a lower
average job satisfaction. They are more likely to leave the job soon be-
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is a fixed cost of training a new worker. A quit deprives the employer
of the value of the training cost. Nagypal suggests that it is plausible
that the costs from the higher turnover of workers hired from the un-
employed considerably more than offsets the easier recruitment of the
unemployed.
If the offset is strong enough, the mix effect goes in the opposite
direction from earlier models with on-the-job search. In NagypaTs cali-
bration, the elasticity of the unemployment rate with respect to pro-
ductivity is about —5. A decline of productivity of 1 percent raises the
unemployment rate by about 0.3 percentage points. Although this is
quite a bit more than in the standard model, it still requires implau-
sibly large shocks to explain the increase in unemployment of two or
three percentage points in the typical recession.
Krause and Lubik (2004), working independently from Nagypal,
present a different model of amplification from on-the-job search. Their
model permits variations in the intensity of on-the job-search, a feature
also present in NagypaTs work. Search effort of workers intending to
move directly to better jobs is highly elastic. When a persistent but ulti-
mately temporary productivity shock hits the economy, the stock of
workers who find it newly desirable to look for higher-wage jobs rises.
During the fairly long period before these workers actually move,
wages do not rise as much as productivity. The surplus available
to employers—the difference between productivity and the wage—
remains high for an extended period. Through the standard mecha-
nism of the Mortensen-Pissarides class of models, the higher surplus
to employers stimulates recruiting effort and tightens the labor mar-
ket. Endogenous wage stickiness delivers a result in their model simi-
lar to the one reported for exogenous wage stickiness in Shimer
(2005a).
The Krause-Lubik view calls for high volatility of job-job flows. They
show that quits, as recorded in the old manufacturing turnover survey,
were quite volatile, but they do not mention the direct measure of the
job-job flow shown in figure 2.2. In their model, as the market tight-
ened from slack conditions in 1994 to extremely tight conditions in
2000, the job-job flow should have risen. Instead, it fell a small amount.
6.2 Shimer and Wright's Model with Hidden Information and Hidden
Action
Shimer and Wright (2004) develop a model of the labor market featur-
ing numerous submarkets. All the employers in a submarket offer the128 Hall
same contingent employment contract to workers who choose to enter
the submarket. Workers know the terms of the contracts in all of the
submarkets and pick the submarket offering the most favorable con-
tract. Having chosen a submarket, the job-seeker encounters a stan-
dard matching technology that delivers a flow probability of meeting
an employer and entering into a contract. The contracting problem has
an action hidden from employers—the investment that the worker
makes in establishing the relationship—and information hidden from
workers—the productivity of the resulting match. The contract needs
to provide an incentive for the worker's effort. The only tool that the
employer can use to induce effort is to make pay contingent on produc-
tivity. To make use of this tool, the employer has to make a credible
announcement of productivity, a variable the worker does not observe
directly. The contract embodies incentives for truthful disclosure by the
employer to achieve credibility. The distribution of match-specific pro-
ductivity is a key object in the model. Under reasonable restrictions on
the distribution, the equilibrium contract is a lump sum plus a bonus if
the firm asks the worker to work, after observing and announcing the
worker's productivity.
Shimer and Wright make important advances on the earlier litera-
ture on employment contracts with hidden action and hidden informa-
tion. They mention some reasons that the model may help explain the
volatility of the job-finding rate and unemployment. The model has a
threshold that is absent from the standard model. Volatility may be
higher because changes in the environment move firms past the thresh-
old. But the paper does not measure the resulting volatility—the
authors are still working on that task.
6.3 Self-Selection
Hall (2005a) considers a rather different hidden-information problem
in the labor market. A job-seeker is either qualified or not qualified for
a particular job. She has information about her likelihood of being
qualified prior to applying for a job with an employer. That informa-
tion is hidden from employers until they test and otherwise evaluate a
job applicant. Making an application is costly to the applicant. Job-
seekers set a cutoff level of the likelihood and apply for every job that
meets the cutoff. Employers know the fraction of applicants who are
qualified and expand job openings up to the point that the surplus
they enjoy from testing and hiring the average applicant exhausts the
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of the surplus exhausts the application cost. Once an applicant is tested
and found qualified, the job-seeker and employer make the standard
Nash bargain.
The key determinant of equilibrium in the labor market in the model
is the cutoff level of the qualification likelihood. The equilibrium is
fragile because a higher cutoff is beneficial to both job-seekers and
employers. The equilibrium is at the intersection of two curves in
surplus-cutoff value space, and the two curves may have almost the
same slope. If the cutoff level is low, the market is in an undesirable
equilibrium—employers are receiving large numbers of applications
from unqualified workers. Employers recruit correspondingly less, so
the market is slack. In a slack market, job-seekers set low cutoffs be-
cause jobs are hard to find. When the cutoff level is high, the market
equilibrium induces efficient self-selection. Employers hire enthusiasti-
cally because each costly test is likely to yield a new employee who is
qualified. Workers set high cutoffs because jobs are easy to find.
This description suggests that the equilibrium is indeterminate,
which is definitely a possibility and is not a borderline case. If the equi-
librium is determinate and satisfies a standard stability condition, the
equilibrium is fragile—it responds sensitively to driving forces.
The driving forces that alter the cutoff qualification level and thus
the job-finding rate do not include productivity. Shifts in productivity
alter the employer's and worker's surplus in proportion, so the inter-
section in cutoff-surplus space occurs at the same cutoff level. The most
interesting potential driving force is a property of the probability dis-
tribution of the signal that job-seekers receive about the likelihood of
qualification for a job. The property is the relation between the cutoff
level adopted by the job-seeker and the average likelihood of the quali-
fication of applicants employing the rule of applying for every job
where the information conveys a likelihood at least as high as the cut-
off. The latter controls the employer's payoff from testing. The elasticity
of the ratio of the two is key. If the elasticity is 1, equilibrium is indeter-
minate. Small changes in the elasticity are a potent driving force for
large fluctuations in the job-finding rate and other aspects of the labor
market.
7 Synthesis
Table 2.3 lists the full set of driving forces identified in the standard
model and in the recent literature revising the standard model to130 Hall
Table 2.3




Real interest rate Standard
Unemployment compensation Standard
Leisure value during search Standard
Separation rate Standard
Match value information hidden from employer Self-selection, on-the-job search
Application cost incurred by job-seeker Self-selection
Match value information hidden from job-seeker Shimer-Wright, Kennan
Wage norm Hall
Job-seeker's payoff during bargaining Hall-Milgrom
Employer's cost of delay during bargaining Hall-Milgrom
increase the predicted amplitude of unemployment fluctuations. For
some entries, I will have little more to say because data are lacking.
Productivity is a natural choice of driving force partly because of the
attention that the real-business-cycle literature has given to it, generally
in models that lack any treatment of unemployment. In the standard
model, higher productivity results in lower unemployment by increas-
ing the surplus from employment and thus increasing the incentives
facing employers to create jobs. As Shimer demonstrated, wage in-
creases take away almost all the increase, so the effect is small in the
standard model. In the variations from the standard model I discussed
earlier, the effect of productivity changes is much greater because the
take-back through wages is smaller or is absent altogether.
Fitting productivity as a driving force into a coherent account of fifty
years of unemployment fluctuations faces some challenges. Productiv-
ity rose dramatically over the period, while unemployment has been
roughly steady. One would need a trend in some other driving force
to offset the effect of growth in productivity to explain the stability of
unemployment—the likely choice is the value of leisure time to job-
seekers. Mechanisms similar to those in real-business-cycle models
might deliver a relationship between the rate of growth of productivity
and unemployment. The data demonstrate a weak relationship, as
shown in figure 2.13. Shimer (2005a) has a figure suggesting a much
tighter relationship, based on Hodrick-Prescott-filtered data. I take theJob Loss, Job Finding, and Unemployment 131
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more ambitious view that the model should be able to explain the
lower-frequency movements that the HP filter removes.
The role of the real interest rate in the standard model and its
variants remains largely unexplored. One reason is that it has proven
difficult to generate movements of real rates in dynamic general-
equilibrium models that resemble those found in the data. Phelps
(1994) gives the real rate an important role in a model based on rather
different principles. In the standard model, a higher real rate raises un-
employment by decreasing the present value of the employer's part
of the surplus, which is the difference between productivity and the
wage. Employers recruit less actively in the face of the lower present
value.
Figure 2.14 suggests that the real rate deserves further consideration
as a driving force. The horizontal axis is the one-year Treasury bill
rate at the beginning of the year less the rate of growth of the con-
sumption deflator over the year—it is the realized real rate. The rela-
tionship has a noticeable and statistically unambiguous upward slope.
But explanation of the high volatility of the real rate has eluded
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The role of unemployment compensation in the determination of un-
employment is straightforward in any model—subsidizing the activity
creates more of it. Figure 2.15 shows the relation over the past fifty
years between the replacement rate for unemployment compensation
and the standard unemployment rate. I measure the numerator of the
replacement rate as the ratio of state and federal unemployment com-
pensation as reported in the Economic Report of the President to the num-
ber of unemployed reported in the CPS. I measure the denominator as
compensation per worker as reported in the U.S. National Income and
Product Accounts. The figure shows no obvious relationship. In partic-
ular, the replacement rate was unusually low in the 1980s, a decade of
high unemployment.
Some of the new models emphasize the shapes of distributions of
hidden information. In the self-selection and on-the-job-search models,
employers make decisions knowing the shape of a distribution of job-
seeker characteristics but not the hidden value for a particular job-
seeker. In the Shimer-Wright and Kennan models, job-seekers make
decisions in the reverse setting. For example, in Kennan's model, a job-
seeker makes a wage demand without knowing the employer's reser-
vation wage based on hidden match productivity. This type of modelJob Loss, Job Finding, and Unemployment 133
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opens the possibility of subtle driving forces involving changes in the
shapes of those distributions.
Changes in distributions may provide the needed link between
the practical macroeconomist's notion of a recession and the class of
theories considered in this paper. When asked to describe a particular
recession or recessions in general, the practical macroeconomist will
omit mention of any of the forces in table 2.3. Instead, the story will
focus on the collapse of purchases of certain categories of products—
producer and consumer durables. For example, all practical accounts
of the recession of 2001 emphasize the huge decline in high-tech invest-
ment. In earlier recessions, declines in home-building were prominent
features.
Table 2.4 shows the changes in employment that occur in various
industries from the peak to the trough, as determined by the National
Bureau of Economic Research. The data confirm the uneven effects of
the forces that cause recessions. Construction, durables, and nondura-
bles manufacturing suffer large employment reductions, while other
industries shrink only slightly or continue to grow.
Models in the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) tradition do
not provide an immediate analysis linking changes in the industry134 Hall
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composition of employment to the aggregate unemployment rate. As
Section 2 of this paper documented, the flows of separations corre-
sponding to the employment changes in table 2.4 are insignificant in
comparison to the normal flows of separations. The rise in unemploy-
ment is the result of diminished job-creation among employers in
general.
The new additions to the DMP class of models may offer some hope
of linking the facts in table 2.4 to the dramatic rise in unemployment
that accompanies every recession. For example, the events leading to a
large decline in employment in durables might shift the economy from
the favorable equilibrium described in the self-selection model to the
unfavorable one. In the favorable equilibrium, the applicants for a job
opening are largely people who know they are qualified. Employers
waste few resources screening out unsuitable applicants. They are cor-
respondingly enthusiastic about creating jobs, so the market is tight. A
subtle change in the distribution of the signal that workers receive
about their likelihood of qualification can move the equilibrium per-
versely. Finding it difficult to locate any job, applicants apply for jobs
where they are less likely to be qualified. Employers are overwhelmed
by applicants and dissipate resources screening out the unqualified
ones. The market becomes slack, with high unemployment.
In Kennan's model, the shape of the distribution of match productiv-
ity, a variable observed only by the employer, has two key roles. Job-
seekers know the distribution but not the realization, so they solve aJob Loss, Job Finding, and Unemployment 135
wage-bidding problem defined by the distribution. Firms earn an
informational rent on the difference between the productivity realiza-
tion and the wage bid. Shifts in the distribution induced by changes in
the composition of employment might result in changes in the rent.
Shimer and Wright's model also has a distribution of individual pro-
ductivity where the realization is hidden from the worker. Changes in
the shape of this distribution may have important effects on the equi-
librium job-finding rate in the model.
The successful model of fluctuations in the job-finding rate will in-
corporate on-the-job search, as emphasized by Nagypal and Krause-
Lubik.
8 Concluding Remarks
The job-finding rate is the key variable in understanding the large fluc-
tuations in unemployment over the past fifty years. The separation
rate, the other determinant of unemployment, has been stable by all
the available evidence. Movements of the job-finding rate occur at
cyclical frequencies—the rate plunges in every recession. Movements
also occur at low frequency—the rate remained low even at the peaks
in the 1950s and early 1960s and again in the 1970s through the end of
the 1980s.
Research has not yet settled on the exogenous driving forces that
cause the secular and cyclical movements of the job-finding rate. Pro-
ductivity and the real interest rate are modestly correlated with un-
employment. New theories have added to the list of driving forces,
including some that raise interesting measurement challenges.
Recent thinking has added many amplification mechanisms that help
explain the strong response of unemployment to what appear to be
small changes in exogenous driving forces. Wage stickiness is moder-
ately plausible as an explanation of the movements of the job-finding
rate over periods of a year or two. The substantial swings of labor-
market conditions over longer periods seem beyond this explanation.
More subtle changes in the economic environment seem promising
ways to explain the movements of the job-finding rate at both cyclical
and subcyclical frequencies.
The business cycle appears to be a complicated phenomenon. I am
convinced that the labor market is the place to look for an understand-
ing of the depth and persistence of recessions. The turnover view is
surely helpful in understanding these issues. The explosion of recent136 Hall
research on amplification mechanisms seems to be leading in a direc-
tion that will create a rich theory capable of explaining the volatility
and amplitude of cyclical and other fluctuations in the job-finding rate.
Endnote
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Steven J. Davis, University of Chicago, National Bureau of Economic
Research
Like several other recent studies, Robert Hall's paper puts the job-
finding rate front and center in the effort to explain unemployment
fluctuations. Three observations motivate this attention to the job-
finding rate. First, the rate at which job-seeking workers find and
accept new employment positions fluctuates in a strongly pro-cyclical
manner. Second, changes in estimated job-finding rates account for
much of the movements in the unemployment rate over time. And
third, the job-finding rate is a key variable in equilibrium search and
matching theories that build on Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982),
and Pissarides (1985). In light of these observations, I share Hall's
view that the hiring decision is a central topic for students of unem-
ployment fluctuations.
My remarks below take issue with other themes in Hall's paper.
For example, Hall suggests that new research and new data challenge
the traditional view that "a recession begins with a wave of layoffs,
mainly in cyclical durable-goods industries." There is little in Hall's
paper or other recent research that undermines this aspect of the
traditional view. It is useful, however, to recognize that the declin-
ing share of aggregate employment in cyclically sensitive durable-
goods industries tends to diminish the wave of layoffs that accompany
recessions.
Hall also downplays the distinction between quits and layoffs, and
the heterogeneous character of separations more generally, choosing
instead to focus on the total rate of job separations. This choice fits
with the theoretical models that Hall considers, but it has three short-
comings as a device for organizing the evidence. First, there is wide
variability in the nature of employment relationships and the resulting
job separations. Some separations reflect the termination of long-tenure140 Davis
employment relationships, some reflect the termination of unsuccessful
matches after a short trial period, and some reflect the end of short
jobs that were never intended to endure. Second, some separations
occur at the initiative of workers (quits) and others at the initiative of
employers (layoffs). Much evidence indicates that the post-separation
path of earnings and unemployment differ sharply between quits
and layoffs. Third, the ratio of quits to layoffs rises and falls with
the growth rate of employment, so that the composition of total sepa-
rations varies in a systematic cyclical manner. I argue below that
the cyclical behavior of job loss and worker displacement remains
a key issue for macroeconomic analyses of labor market fluctua-
tions. In this respect, my views are closer to Hall (1995) than Hall
(2005).
Hall's Method for Estimating Separation Rates Back to 1948
To estimate the rate of job separations back to 1948, Hall first fits
the relationship between separations and net employment growth to
monthly, industry-level data for the period covered by the Job Open-
ings and Labor Turnover Survey (December 2000 onward). He then
relies on the fitted relationship and historical data on net employment
growth to obtain an estimated series for the job separations rate back
to 1948, shown in figure 2.2.
To evaluate Hall's method, it is helpful to plot the industry-level
data on the separations rate against the net growth rate. See figure
2.16, which also shows a nonparametric regression fit of the separa-
tions rate to the net growth rate. There is a pronounced nonlinearity in
the separations-net relationship, with a slope of about —1.6 to the left
of 0 and 0.6 to the right of 0. By way of comparison, Hall obtains an
estimated slope of —0.29 to the left of 0 and 0.05 to the right of 0.1 sus-
pect that Hall finds a much flatter relationship and a much less pro-
nounced nonlinearity because his regression relies on the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) establishment survey for data on industry-level
employment growth. In contrast, figure 2.16 relies on Job Openings
and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) data for both the separations rate
and the net growth rate. Discrepancies between the two surveys lead
to measurement error in Hall's regressors, which is likely to attenuate
the estimated relationship.
1 The fitted relationship in figure 2.16 would
produce a greater rise in the estimated separations rate during reces-
sions, especially deep ones, than Hall's fitted relationship. I concludeComment 141
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Figure 2.16
Separation Rates as a Function of NET (Not Seasonally Adjusted Data)
Note: Loess smoothing plot using JOLTS monthly flows, December 2000 to October
2004. Bandwidth = .8.
that Hall understates the volatility and cyclical movements in the total
separations rate.
Hall's Method for Estimating Job-Finding Rates Back to 1948
Given the separations rate, s, Hall calculates the job-finding rate as:
/ = s(E/X) => log(/) = log(s) + log(E/X) (1)
where E denotes employment and X is Hall's measure of expanded
unemployment. It follows from equation (1) that any understatement
in the cyclical variation of the estimated separations rate translates
directly into a corresponding overstatement for the job-finding rate.
Hence, I also conclude that Hall exaggerates cyclical movements in the
job-finding rate. This conclusion is reinforced by comparing Hall's
series for the job-finding rate in figure 2.9 to direct estimates of the
job-finding rate for unemployed workers in Bleakley et al. (1999)
and Shimer (2005a, 2005b). Nevertheless, it is important to recognize
that direct estimates of job-finding rates for unemployed workers also
show strongly pro-cyclical movements.142 Davis
The Job-Finding Rate and the Cyclical Behavior of Unemployment
Flows
Changes in the job-finding rate play a bigger role than changes in the
separations rate in accounting for movements in the unemployment
rate. Hall states this point in a very strong form, claiming, "Unemploy-
ment rises [in recessions] almost entirely because jobs become harder
to find." Shimer (2005b) makes the point using the steady-state expres-
sion for unemployment:
(Steady-state unemployment rate)f = st/(st + ft) (2)
where st denotes the rate of job separations for employed persons at t,
and ft denotes the job-finding rate for unemployed persons. Shimer
observes that this steady-state expression closely approximates the
actual unemployment rate in monthly data. In light of this observation,
he compares equation (2) to the time series generated by s/(s + /f),
where s is the mean separations rate. This generated series closely
tracks major movements in the postwar U.S. unemployment rate, al-
though it typically understates the rise in unemployment during reces-
sions. In comparison, the time series generated by st/(st + /) fares not
nearly as well in accounting for unemployment rate movements. These
results lead Shimer to conclude that changes in the job-finding rate
play the major role in accounting for unemployment rate movements,
very similar to Hall's view.
However, it is also important to recognize that the cyclical behavior
of unemployment inflows and outflows cannot be explained without
appealing to a leading role for changes in the job separations rate.
Several empirical studies document the rise in worker flows from em-
ployment to unemployment and from unemployment to employment
during postwar U.S. recessions.
2 For example, figure 2.10 in Blanchard
and Diamond (1990) shows that the monthly flows from employment
to unemployment nearly double during the 1970 and 1973-1975 reces-
sions, and that flows from unemployment to employment rise by more
than one-third. Accounting for this pattern in unemployment flows
requires a central role for the job separations rate.
To see this point, consider figure 2.17, which plots the monthly path
of unemployment, worker flows from employment to unemployment
(E —•> U), and worker flows from unemployment to employment
(U —> E) in response to a hypothetical drop in the job-finding rate. All
three variables are expressed as percentages of a constant labor force.Comment 143
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Measured Responses to Drop in Job-Finding Rate as a Percentage of Labor Force,
Monthly Sampling of Continuous-Time Process
In generating these response paths, I consider a two-state system that
starts at a steady state with a monthly job-finding probability of .46
and a monthly job separation probability of .035, the mean values in
the postwar U.S. economy according to Shimer's estimates. As seen in
figure 2.17, a drop in the job-finding probability to .30 raises the unem-
ployment rate from about 5 percent to about 9 percent. In constructing
the figure, I rely on Shimer's careful analysis of time aggregation to
simulate measured flows given monthly sampling of a continuous-
time process.
3 In this way, I capture the measured rise in E —> U flows
associated with a drop in the job-finding probability and a greater like-
lihood that a job-losing worker is unemployed at the sampling date.
Figure 2.17 illustrates two points. First, the large drop in the job-
finding rate triggers a modest rise of roughly 10 percent in the mea-
sured E -> U flows, much smaller than the observed rise in major
recessions. Thus, the time aggregation effect, while undoubtedly pres-
ent in the data, is too weak to account for the recessionary rise in
E —*• U flows documented by Blanchard and Diamond and other144 Davis
researchers. To explain this rise, it is essential to posit a sharp rise in
the job separations rate. Second, the hypothetical drop in the job-
finding rate leads to a decline in measured U —> E flows on impact
and in the near-term aftermath. This hypothetical response path is dra-
matically at odds with the evidence. To explain the evidence, it is again
necessary to posit a sharp rise in the separations rate. In fact, the two-
state system can simultaneously generate large increases in E —>• U and
U —> E flows by combining a sizable drop in the job-finding rate with a
sizable rise in the separations rate.
These observations about the cyclical behavior of unemployment
inflows and outflows provide another indication that something is
amiss in Hall's characterization of the job separations rate. Either the
separations rate exhibits considerable countercyclical variation, con-
trary to Hall's claim, or the propensity of separated workers to become
unemployed rises sharply in recessions. A lower job-finding rate does
not, by itself, raise measured unemployment inflows by nearly enough
to explain the data.
Cyclical Variation in Quits, Layoffs, and the Composition of Job
Separations
A long line of empirical research—dating back at least to Slichter (1921)
and Woytinksy (1942) and including more recent contributions by
Akerlof et al. (1988) and others—stresses the pro-cyclical behavior of
quits and the countercyclical behavior of layoffs. JOLTS data show the
same pattern, but the decline in quits and the rise in layoffs are small in
the recent recession, as Hall notes. Of course, the recent recession also
involves a mild employment contraction, which may account for the
modest movements in quit and layoff rates.
Figure 2.18, reproduced from Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger
(2005), provides some evidence on this point. The figure plots the
layoff-separation ratio against the net employment growth rate in the
manufacturing sector for the recent period covered by JOLTS and for
the 1947 to 1981 period covered by the BLS Manufacturing Turnover
Data (MTD).
4 A quadratic polynomial in the net growth rate is sepa-
rately fit to the observations from each data set. The figure shows that
layoffs account for a larger (smaller) fraction of separations when the
employment growth rate is low (high). The layoff-separation ratio
varies widely, ranging from less than .2 to more than .7. The sensitivity
of the layoff-separation ratio to the net growth rate is nearly identical
in the JOLTS and the MTD, but the range of net growth rate observa-Comment 145
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Figure 2.18
Layoff-Separation Ratio in Manufacturing, Monthly, Seasonally Adjusted Data
Note: Fitted values from quadratic polynomial in NET.
tions is much narrower in the JOLTS. That is, figure 2.18 indicates that
the period covered by JOLTS exhibits modest variation in the layoff-
separation ratio because employment growth fluctuates in a narrow
range during the JOLTS sample period.
Another BLS data set provides additional evidence on the behavior
of layoffs before, during, and after the 2001 recession. The Mass Layoff
Statistics (MLS) report monthly data for mass layoff actions—episodes
in which an establishment has at least fifty initial claims for unem-
ployment insurance during a five-week period. The MLS reports the
number of such actions and the number of unemployment insurance
claimants involved in these actions. This number is a much narrower
measure of layoffs than the JOLTS measure, but the concept of mass
layoff actions is closer to the worker displacement events that are asso-
ciated with large and persistent earnings losses for laid-off workers.
5
Figure 2.19 reproduces a BLS chart for the number of claimants
involved in mass layoff actions from June 2000 to May 2005.
6 MLS
data for the five years prior to June 2000 show that the number of
mass layoff claimants fluctuates in the range of roughly 100,000 to
150,000 per month, except for a single month in 1998. Hence, the sus-
tained upsurge in mass layoff claimants that begins in November 2000









Mass Layoff Initial Claims, Seasonally Adjusted, June 2000 to May 2005
These data support the view that recessions, including the mild reces-
sion of 2001, bring a wave of additional layoffs. Figure 2.19 also shows
that the manufacturing sector accounts for a disproportionate share of
these additional layoffs, in line with the traditional view of recessions.
Boisjoly et al. (1998) provide evidence on the cyclical nature of layoff
rates using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. They
consider male household heads, 25-59 years old, with at least one year
of tenure on the job and at least 1,000 hours of work in the previous
year. Their figures 2.16 and 2.17, which cover the period from 1968 to
1992, show that layoff rates for these workers rise by roughly 50-100
percent in recessions. Many authors have produced evidence of large
countercyclical movements in layoff rates by examining Current Popu-
lation Survey (CPS) data on unemployment inflows by reason for un-
employment and worker flows out of employment by reason. See, for
example, Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996, chapter 6) and Bleak-
ley et al. (1999).
The Cyclical Behavior of Job Destruction Rates
A decline in the common component of plant-level employment
growth raises the job destruction rate and lowers the job creation rate.
If the common component were the whole story behind cyclical move-Comment 147
merits in job creation and destruction, then the two series would
exhibit similar variability over time. In fact, the shape of the cross-
sectional growth rate density changes over the cycle in a way that
accentuates the job destruction rise in downturns. Davis and Halti-
wanger (1989, 1990) and Foote (1998) provide evidence on this point.
As Foote (1998, p. 818) put it, an aggregate employment contraction
involves "an increase in the number of firms making large downward
adjustments, with comparatively little change in the number of firms
making positive adjustments or none at all."
7
One way to see this point is to compare the job destruction series
generated by the common component of plant-level growth to the
actual job destruction series. I carry out this comparison along the lines
suggested by Hall's equation (2). First, I fit the empirical distribution
of plant-level growth rates, F(e) in Hall's notation, to quarterly plant-
level data in the Longitudinal Research Database for the 1972 to 1993
period. There are more than 4 million plant-level observations, so it is
easy to obtain precise estimates of F(s) using simple nonparametric
methods. Next, given the average empirical distribution F(s), I feed
through the realized time series of aggregate net employment growth
rates, zt. This procedure yields a simulated job destruction series, dt in
Hall's notation, which I compare to the actual job destruction series
in figure 2.20.
8 Figure 2.21 reports an analogous comparison for job
creation.
Figure 2.20 shows that the simulated destruction series understates
the observed job destruction spike in all four recessions, more so in the
deeper contractions of 1973-1974 and 1981-1982. Likewise, figure 2.21
shows that the simulated creation series overstates the decline in actual
job creation in recessions. The variance ratio, Var(JD)/Var(JC), is 1.04
in the simulated data and 2.26 in the actual data. Thus, the asymmetry
in the cyclical behavior of job creation and destruction is not captured
by movements in the common component of plant-level employment
growth.
The Connection Between Job Destruction and Layoffs
Job destruction is closely associated with layoffs and worker displace-
ment. Several pieces of evidence support this claim. For example,
Bleakley et al. (1999) show that major job destruction spikes in the
manufacturing sector coincide with spikes in the flow of manufactur-
ing workers out of employment. This pattern is apparent in one of their
charts, reproduced here as figure 2.22. The lower curve in figure 2.22148 Davis
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Figure 2.22
Worker and Job Flows in Manufacturing: Worker Flows Out of Employment Versus Job
Destruction
shows the quarterly job destruction rate in the U.S. manufacturing sec-
tor, as calculated from the LRD by Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh
(1996) and expressed at a monthly rate. The upper curve shows the
monthly exit rate from manufacturing employment to unemployment
or out of the labor force, as calculated from CPS gross flows data by
Bleakley et al. The two curves mirror one another closely in the three
recession episodes.
9
The JOLTS data afford new opportunities to investigate the relation-
ship between job and worker flows. Pursuing this line of investigation,
Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2005) show in their figure 2.12 a
tight link between job destruction and layoffs in the cross-section of
JOLTS establishments. Their table 2.3 reports a monthly time-series re-
gression of the JOLTS layoff rate on JOLTS-based job creation and de-
struction rates. The estimated regression coefficients are —.02 on the
creation rate and .59 on the destruction rate, with a standard error of
about .06 for both coefficients. The adjusted R-squared value for the re-
gression is .76. This time-series regression implies that the layoff rate is
highly sensitive to the job destruction rate. In short, the JOLTS data
show a close connection between job destruction and layoffs over time
at the aggregate level and in the cross section of establishment-level
observations.
This JOLTS-based evidence also provides additional support for
the view that layoff rates fluctuate in a strongly countercyclical man-
ner. In particular, the JOLTS times-series regression implies fifty-nine150 Davis
additional layoffs for each 100 destroyed jobs. By all available evi-
dence, the job destruction rate rises in recessions, sharply so in the
manufacturing sector.
The Quit-Layoff Distinction
There is a large body of research on the wage, earnings, and employ-
ment outcomes associated with quits and layoffs. As I now discuss,
this research provides good reasons to question Hall's focus on the
total job separations rate and his decision to downplay the quit-layoff
distinction.
Layoffs are associated with greater unemployment incidence and
longer unemployment spells than quits. For example, Leighton and
Mincer (1982) find that laid-off workers are twice as likely as quits to
become unemployed in the National Longitudinal Survey of men. Sim-
ilarly, McLaughlin (1990) finds higher unemployment incidence for
laid-off workers in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Mincer
(1986) finds that two-thirds of layoffs among white men result in un-
employment as compared to one-third of quits. Conditional on unem-
ployment, mean spell length is nearly twice as long for laid-off
workers in Mincer's study. Similarly, CPS data show that monthly es-
cape rates from unemployment are 10-15 percentage points lower for
permanent layoffs than for quits. See figure 6.8 in Davis, Haltiwanger,
and Schuh (1996) and figure 2.19 in Bleakley et al. (1999).
Many laid-off workers experience large and persistent earnings
losses, apparently as a direct consequence of job loss. The evidence on
this point is most dramatic and compelling for prime-age workers
who lose high-tenure jobs in mass layoff events. These job losers expe-
rience large, persistent declines in earnings relative to their previous
earnings and relative to the earnings of observationally similar workers
who are not laid off. Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan (1993) provide
one of the best and best-known studies of this phenomenon. Stevens
(1997) finds that an initial displacement event raises a worker's inci-
dence of job loss for several years thereafter. Similarly, Ruhm (1991)
finds that displaced workers experience higher unemployment rates
for at least four years after the initial job loss event. Topel (1990)
presents evidence that earnings losses (relative to pre-displacement
levels) are smaller and less persistent for job losers with lower tenure.
Summarizing the evidence on the quit-layoff distinction: laid-off
workers are more likely to become unemployed, they have lower exitComment 151
rates from unemployment, they experience less employment stability
following an initial displacement event, they often experience a large
and persistent decline in earnings, and the loss in earnings is bigger
and more persistent for job losers with higher tenure. As I have also
discussed, the incidence of layoffs fluctuates in a strongly counter-
cyclical manner. In short, laid-off workers experience significantly
worse labor market outcomes, and recessions bring many more laid-
off workers.
There are many competing interpretations for these and other sys-
tematic outcome differences between quits and layoffs. One view inter-
prets all separations (and retentions) as efficient outcomes in the sense
that they maximize the joint surplus of employer and worker. Accord-
ing to this view, quits and layoffs are mere labels that lack deeper
economic significance. McLaughlin (1990, 1991) provides the most
detailed development of this view. Another view, articulated by Hall
and Lazear (1984), stresses two-sided information asymmetries that
preclude fully efficient separation outcomes in bilateral employment
relationships. According to this view, second-best solutions to informa-
tional problems lead to real wage rigidity and the excess sensitivity of
quits and layoffs to labor demand.
1
0 Other interpretations of the quit-
layoff distinction stress legal and institutional constraints on compen-
sation and separations, negative effects of wage cuts on employee
morale and productivity (Bewley 1999), adverse selection effects on
quits and workforce quality induced by wage cuts (Weiss 1990), and
insider-outsider conflicts that lead to inefficient wage structures and
rigid separation policies (Lindbeck and Snower 2002).
Many of these other interpretations of the quit-layoff distinction
depart, implicitly or explicitly, from a strictly bilateral perspective on
compensation, separations, and other aspects of the employment rela-
tionship. Collective bargaining provides an obvious example. Aside
from collective bargaining and legal constraints, employers often rely
on wage policies—rather than individually bargained wages—to de-
termine compensation and influence turnover. These policies specify
wages as a function of seniority, credentials, and position within an or-
ganization, and concerns about internal pay structure loom large. Such
"multilateral" compensation policies offer greater scope for a meaning-
ful distinction between quits and layoffs than the bilateral perspective
that pervades equilibrium search theories. It is a challenge to incor-
porate multilateral aspects of compensation and turnover and depar-
tures from bilateral efficiency into equilibrium search models. My152 Davis
impression is that equilibrium search theories have, for the most part,
steered clear of these issues for reasons of analytical simplicity rather
than evidence that they are unimportant.
Unemployment and Earnings Losses in Equilibrium Search Models
In the class of equilibrium search models with efficient separations and
homogeneous workers and jobs, the impact of job loss and unemploy-
ment on lifetime earnings is rather modest. More to the point, the earn-
ings losses in these models are much smaller than the estimated impact
of job loss in the empirical literature on displaced workers. Simple
back-of-the envelope calculations serve to illustrate these points.
First, consider the impact of job loss and unemployment in the
theory. Make the following assumptions:
1. An expected working life of forty years with 5.5 percent of time
spent unemployed.
2. A flat wage profile.
3. Job loss brings one month of unemployment, followed by a return
to employment at the job-finding rate of .46 per month.
4. No unemployment benefits.
5. An annual discount rate of 3 percent.
Given these assumptions, the negative income effect associated with
unemployment amounts to 0.8 percent of expected lifetime earnings in
present value terms. If jobless benefits are available for the first six
months of an unemployment spell at a replacement rate of 40 percent,
then the negative income effect shrinks to 0.5 percent of lifetime earn-
ings. If, instead, we assume that the job-finding rate is only .30 per
month, then the negative income effect of unemployment amounts to
1.2 percent of lifetime earnings in the case of no unemployment bene-
fits, and 0.8 percent in the case with unemployment benefits. If any-
thing, these numbers overstate the impact of job loss in this class of
models because I have ignored other sources of implicit income during
unemployment and because I have assumed that job loss always
entails at least one month of unemployment.
Now consider the impact of job loss in the empirical literature on
displaced workers. I draw on the estimated earnings impact of job loss
in the study by Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan (1993). They consider a
mass-layoff sample of workers with job tenure of six or more years andComment 153
who lose jobs during the early and mid-1980s. Their sample contains
job separators from establishments in Pennsylvania that, within a year
of separation, have employment levels at least 30 percent below their
maximum levels in the late 1970s. They further require that the em-
ployer have at least fifty employees in 1979, and that separators have
positive earnings (in Pennsylvania) during each calendar year. They
find that mean earnings fall by 50 percent in the quarter of displace-
ment, then recover by roughly half over the following six quarters.
Five years after displacement, mean earnings remain 25 percent below
pre-displacement levels.
Based on this evidence, consider an illustrative calculation in which
displacement brings a 40 percent earnings reduction in year 1, a 30 per-
cent reduction in year 2, and a 25 percent reduction in years 3 to 6. This
time profile of lost earnings implies that job displacement lowers the
present value of lifetime earnings by roughly 8 to 18 percent, depend-
ing on whether and when earnings return to baseline after year 6
and assuming that the displacement event occurs at the midpoint of
the working life. Thus, the estimated earnings losses associated with
worker displacement in the study by Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan
are an order of magnitude larger than the losses implied by the class
of equilibrium search models with efficient separations and homoge-
neous workers and jobs. See Den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000) for
a much fuller analysis of whether equilibrium search models can ex-
plain the empirical evidence on displaced workers.
My illustrative calculations highlight the wide gulf between equilib-
rium search models with efficient separations and the empirical evi-
dence on the earnings effects of job loss and worker displacement. One
might respond that this class of models has focused on unemployment
fluctuations and labor market flows, not the earnings losses associated
with job loss. No doubt, this focus is a useful one in many respects.
But this focus is too narrow to address many of the most important
questions associated with job loss and cyclical fluctuations in the labor
market.
Concluding Remarks
Let me summarize my main points:
1. Although he overstates the case, Hall rightly stresses the pro-cyclical
behavior of the job-finding rate in his account of unemployment rate154 Davis
fluctuations. Progress in research on the economics of the job-finding
rate can significantly improve our understanding of unemployment
behavior.
2. Hall understates the extent of countercyclical movements in the job
separations rate. More important, his focus on the total separations
rate is misplaced in my view. Layoffs are strongly countercyclical, and
quits are strongly pro-cyclical. Laid-off workers become unemployed
at a higher rate, experience longer unemployment spells, and have in-
ferior post-separation earnings paths.
3. Explaining the cyclical behavior of unemployment inflows and out-
flows requires a leading role for countercyclical movements in the job
separations rate or the propensity of separated workers to become
unemployed.
4. Job destruction and layoffs are closely connected in the micro cross
section and over time at the aggregate level. Mass layoff events associ-
ated with rapid job destruction involve large and persistent earnings
losses for many of the job losers.
5. The quit-layoff distinction, the efficiency of separations, and em-
pirical evidence on the earnings losses of displaced workers are trou-
blesome issues for equilibrium search theories of unemployment and
labor market flows. Attention to these issues is essential if these
theories are to provide a broad analytical treatment of labor market
fluctuations and their consequences.
Endnotes
1. Sampling variability is one potentially important source of attenuation bias. In this re-
gard, the precision of the establishment survey measures is not the key issue. Rather, the
issue is whether the establishment survey accurately mimics industry-level growth rates
for the much smaller set of establishments sampled in the JOLTS. In addition, there are
discrepancies between the establishment survey and the JOLTS that do not appear to be
the result of sampling variability. These discrepancies are apparent even at the aggregate
level. For example, the establishment survey shows a net private sector employment de-
cline of —1.35 percent from December 2000 to September 2004. In contrast, the cumulated
difference between hires and separations in the JOLTS over this period amounts to an
increase of 0.88 percent of December 2000 employment. (These calculations make use of
data not seasonally adjusted and downloaded from the BLS web site on July 29, 2005. I
have made a small adjustment to the JOLTS data to account for differences in the within-
month timing of the two surveys.)
2. A partial list includes Darby, Haltiwanger, and Plant (1986); Davis (1987); Blanchard
and Diamond (1990); Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996); and Bleakley et al. (1999).Comment 155
3. Footnote 5 on page 10 of Shimer (2005b) displays the relevant state equations.
4. The Manufacturing Turnover Data were discontinued in 1981.
5. For example, see Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan (1993).
6. Downloaded from the BLS web site on July 21, 2005.
7. While Davis and Haltiwanger (1989,1990) and Foote (1998) reach similar conclusions
about the cyclical behavior of the cross-sectional growth rate distribution, the topic mer-
its further study. Davis and Haltiwanger consider the U.S. manufacturing sector only,
and Foote considers a single state, Michigan.
8. An issue that arises in executing this procedure is how to handle the large mass point
in the empirical distribution at a growth rate of zero. This mass point is present at all
stages of the business cycle, and its size does not vary systematically with the cycle. In
calculating the simulated job creation and destruction series, I let the zero mass point
vary in size over time exactly as it does in the data, but I do not shift its location.
9. The analysis in Bleakley et al. also indicates that much of the comovement in the two
series reflects temporary layoffs, i.e., separations of workers who expect to be recalled to
their former jobs. Temporary layoffs are another aspect of heterogeneity in the character
of job separations.
10. Although not focused on the quit-layoff distinction, Ramey and Watson (1997) de-
velop a different theory of inefficient separations that does not rely on wage rigidity.
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John Kennan, University of Wisconsin and NBER
The main theme of Robert Hall's paper is that cyclical fluctuations in
unemployment are driven almost entirely by fluctuations in the job-
finding rate, as opposed to fluctuations in the separation rate from em-
ployment, and that we do not yet have a satisfactory theory for why
the job-finding rate is so variable. Hall's review of recent attempts to
build a theory of fluctuations in job-finding rates is interesting and val-
uable, and I won't say anything more about it. This comment deals
mainly with Hall's analysis of the empirical evidence on fluctuations
in the separation rate.
As Hall points out, his reading of the data runs counter to what
many economists had previously believed. Darby, Haltiwanger, and
Plant (1986) asked whether cyclical fluctuations in the stock of unem-
ployed workers are caused mainly by fluctuations in the inflow or by
fluctuations in the outflow. They concluded, "The main proximate de-
terminant of changes in the unemployment rate is variations in the
level and distribution of inflows into unemployment." Blanchard and
Diamond (1990) analyzed fluctuations in employment and reached a
similar conclusion: "The amplitude of fluctuations in the flow out of
employment is larger than that of the flow into employment Re-
duced employment in recessions results more from high rates of job
destruction than low rates of job creation." Davis, Haltiwanger, and
Schuh (1996) concurred: "[Unemployment inflows and employment
outflows account for most of the cyclical variation in employment and
unemployment. During recessions, unemployment inflows and em-
ployment outflows rise dramatically. Unemployment outflows and
employment inflows also rise during recessions, but by less than their
counterparts and not until later in a recession."
More recently, however, Shimer (2005b) argued, as Hall does, that











Weekly UI Claims, Seasonally Adjusted
job finding probability is strongly procyclical, while the separation
probability was weakly countercyclical until the mid 1980s and more
recently has been acyclic through two downturns in the labor market.
These findings sharply contradict the conventional wisdom that fluctu-
ations in the separation probability (or in job destruction) are the key to
understanding the business cycle."
To help put this argument in perspective, it is useful to consider two
unemployment indicators for the most recent recession. The first is
weekly claims for unemployment insurance (UI), shown in figure 2.23.
The second, shown in figure 2.24, is the Job Openings and Labor Turn-
over Survey (JOLTS) series on total separations (the numerator of the
separation rate in Hall's figure 2.1). Initial UI claims almost doubled at
the start of the recession, confirming the conventional view. Separa-
tions also rose but not by very much, confirming Hall's view.
As we know (largely from reading Hall's papers), data on labor mar-
ket flows are complicated, and it is easy to get confused.
1 Workers who
file initial UI claims have just been separated from their jobs. So how
can there be a dramatic rise in initial UI claims without much move-
ment in the separation rate?
Separations are workers who leave the payroll. As Hall points out,
there is no implication that these workers becomes unemployed (and
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number of separated workers who become unemployed at the start of
a recession is largely offset by a decrease in the number of workers
who move from one job to another.
2
But why should we be concerned with the separation rate rather
than the transition rate from employment to unemployment (the EU
rate)? After all, the rate at which workers change jobs doesn't (directly)
contribute to unemployment fluctuations (or to employment fluctua-
tions). Hall suggests that a decrease in the job-changing rate indicates
that the job-finding probability has fallen. Suppose the separation rate
is constant. Some workers who are separated immediately find new
jobs. Others are unemployed for a while. If the job-finding probability
falls, more of the separated workers will be unemployed. It will seem
that an increase in the inflow to unemployment is responsible for the
rise in unemployment (and it is indeed a proximate cause). But it is
not that people are being dumped out of jobs at an unusual rate.
This is a nice theory, but it is not clear that it has anything to do with
the facts. If the theory is right, one might expect to see a drop in the
job-finding probability at the very beginning of a recession, followed by
an increase in the EU rate. The recent UI data are shown in figure 2.25.
















UI Entry and Exit Rates, 7-Week Moving Averages
indicator of the job-finding probability because the number of exits due
to benefit exhaustion is small, and it seems unlikely that many people
leave the labor force while they are still eligible for benefits. By this
measure, the job-finding probability clearly fell in the recession (from
about 12 percent to about 10 percent, per week). But this drop did not
precede the rise in the E —> U rate (initial claims as a proportion of cov-
ered employment). Instead, the E —» U rate started to rise some months
before the UI exit rate started to fall at the start of the recession.
Hall describes the evidence for an acyclical separation rate as reason-
ably compelling but not strong.
3 The main problem with this evidence
arises because the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey did not
begin until December 2000 (several months after the most recent reces-
sion began, according to figure 2.23). What about the evidence on the
job-finding rate? This is presented in figure 2.9, and summarized by
saying, "The job-finding rate is highly cyclical—it plunges in every
recession." The job-finding rate is the number of workers hired in a
month divided by the number of people looking for jobs. Figure 2.26
shows these two series separately, using Hall's data (the series in Hall's
figure 2.9 is the ratio of the two series in figure 2.26). Since data on
hires are not available before the start of the JOLTS series, Hall predicts
the number of hires from observed employment growth, using the
JOLTS data to estimate the coefficients in the prediction formula. Since
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Hall uses the number of unemployed people, expanded to include the
(predicted) number of discouraged workers and "marginally attached"
workers.
It is clear from figure 2.26 why Hall's estimated job-finding rate
plunges in every recession: it is essentially a trend divided by the
unemployment rate. As Hall emphasizes, one cannot understand un-
employment fluctuations without understanding why the number of
workers hired each month changes very little in response to big
changes in the number of people unemployed. This is a quantitative
issue, first raised by Shimer (2005a). The Mortensen-Pissarides model
does predict a decrease in the job-finding rate in response to a reduc-
tion in productivity, but for plausible parameter values, the magnitude
of the response is tiny relative to the variations seen in the data.
In summary, Hall's analysis of the separation rate raises an interest-
ing question about why the flow of workers changing jobs decreases
in a recession, while the flow leaving jobs and becoming unemployed
increases. Unless one believes that this is driven by changes in the job-
finding probability, there is nothing in the paper that overturns the
conventional wisdom about the proximate causes of unemployment
volatility. But Hall makes a persuasive case that a full understanding
of unemployment fluctuations requires a better theory of fluctuations
in the job-finding probability.164 Kennan
Endnotes
1. In the standard model of worker flows, there are three states (employed, unemployed,
and out of the labor market), with six flows between these states. Taking the flows as a
fraction of the stocks in either the source state or the destination state yields twelve rates
of flow (for example, the entry rate to unemployment is the number of newly unem-
ployed workers, as a proportion of the unemployment stock). Both the job-finding rate
and the separation rate are mongrels, which are not included in this set of twelve rates of
flow. The job-finding rate is the flow into employment, as a proportion of the stock of
people looking for work. The separation rate is the flow of people leaving employers'
payrolls, as a proportion of the employment stock. And even if we knew all of these
rates, we would still not have enough information to determine the rates of job destruc-
tion and job creation.
2. Shimer (2005b) defines the separation probability as the probability that a worker who
is employed now will not be employed next period. So when Shimer says that the separa-
tion probability is acyclical, and Hall says that the separation rate is acyclical, they are
contradicting each other. This makes it even easier to get confused.
3. Oracles are known for making statements like this.
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Many participants tried to reconcile previous theories of labor markets
with Robert Hall's new view of labor markets during a recession.
Daron Acemoglu wondered why the old literature on job flows
shows convincingly that quit rates fall and layoff rates rise during
recessions, yet Hall's analysis using the Job Openings and Labor Turn-
over Survey (JOLTS) data suggests that, in the 2001 recession, the mag-
nitude of these changes was very small.
Mark Gertler noted that the evidence in Hall's paper and Steve
Davis's comment indicates that for the last two recessions, variation in
the hiring rate is responsible for most of the action in unemployment.
Yet for the recessions of the 1970s and 1980s, layoffs were more impor-
tant. Gertler posed the question: what will happen in the future? If the
United States returns to recessions with big contractions in manufac-
turing, will layoffs once again become the more important determinant
of unemployment? Bob Hall replied that quantitatively, it is correct that
layoffs played a larger role in the earlier recessions. But qualitatively,
separations cannot be numerically important. The observed amount of
employment decline that occurred in the earlier recessions puts a bound
on separations. Referring to figure 2.2, which displays an approxima-
tion of separation rates for years before the JOLTS data is available,
Hall reiterated that, even assuming that all employment decline is sep-
arations, that can generate only 30 or 40 basis points a month.
Andrew Levin agreed with Gertler that the recent recessions look
different from past recessions and attributed the difference to different
kinds of shocks. He provided a comparison between the 1981-1982 re-
cession and the 2001 recession. The 1981-1982 recession was perhaps
caused by a large shift in monetary policy that raised real interest rates.
Vector autoregression (VAR) analysis done by Levin and colleagues
shows that, as a result, auto sales and housing construction took big166 Discussion
hits. In contrast, during the most recent recession, monetary policy was
easing as much as possible, bringing down real interest rates and caus-
ing auto sales and construction to remain strong. So it should not be
surprising, Levin concluded, that the recent recessions look different
from the earlier recessions. Hall cautioned, however, that this notion
that "every recession has its own personality" turns out to be com-
pletely false in the labor market. All postwar recessions look remark-
ably alike in terms of employment changes (for example, a 14 percent
decline in employment in durables, a 5 percent decline in construction,
a 2 percent increase in government).
Other comments were related to modeling strategies in light of this
new view of labor markets. Valery Ramey suggested that a reasonable
model should make separations endogenous. Hall agreed with this in
principle but cautioned that if separations become the driving force of
recessions, then you lose the tremendous decline in recruiting effort
(vacancies, help-wanted advertising) that is actually seen in the data.
To get realistic fluctuations in this recruiting effort, there cannot be too
many bargains available to firms in the form of recently separated
workers. Although methodologically endogenous separation is desir-
able, in terms of matching the data, it may be problematic.
Andrew Levin pushed the notion of endogenous separations further
by suggesting that models that endogenize separation might also
endogenize the components of separation: quits and layoffs. During a
recession, even if the separation rate is constant, fewer people may be
quitting if they know it is more difficult to find a job, and more people
may be involuntarily laid off. Levin suggested that a model that
includes these two components may be a fruitful path for future labor
market research. Hall enthusiastically agreed with this, noting that the
traditional work by Diamond, Mortensen, and Pissarides focuses on an
efficient separation between worker and firm. How this split comes
about (whether a separation is a quit or a layoff is not always clear)
questions how the mechanism that governs the efficient employment
relationship actually works.
And finally, an observation was made that the distinguishing fea-
ture of labor markets in the United States is the churning process.
According to the JOLTS data, about one-third of all workers separate.
So perhaps all of this discussion about the cyclical variation in unem-
ployment is second order.